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Abstract  
This paper analyses the monetary policy that the Most Serene Republic of Venice implemented 
in the years of calamities using a modern equivalent of helicopter money, precisely  an  
extraordinary money issuing, coupled with capital losses for the issuer. We consider the 1629 
famine and the 1630-1631 plague as a negative macroeconomic shock that the incumbent 
government addressed using fiscal monetization. Consolidating the balance sheets of the Mint 
and of the Giro Bank, and having heterogenous citizens – inequality matters - we show that the 
Republic implemented what was, in effect, helicopter money driven by political economy  
reasons, in order to avoid popular riots.  
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1. Introduction  
Let us suppose now that one day a helicopter flies over this community and drops an additional $1,000 in 
bills from the sky, which is, of course, hastily collected by members of the community. Let us suppose further that 
everyone is convinced that this is a unique event which will never be repeated. (Milton Friedman, 1968) 
“100,000 ducats in small change in copper shall be minted and distributed, especially to members of the silk 
and wool trade who needed it, to repay the debt”  (Most Serene Republic of Venice, 29 July 1630)  
 
The COVID-19 pandemic forces swept away some of the conventional taboos in 
economic thinking, such as the radical idea of helicopter money ( Benigno and Nisticò 2020a, 
Cukierman 2020, Galì 2020, Yashiv 2020, Kapoor and Buiter 2020, Velasco et al. 2020). The term 
uses the fanciful imagery that was originally invented by Milton Friedman (1968).  
Starting from the end of the 1990s this Friedman idea has received more attention in 
academia and policy circles.  Figure 1 shows the evolution of  academic papers focused on 
macroeconomic issues that contain in the title, in the abstract or as a keyword, the expression 
“helicopter money”, showing that whenever the economic conditions become critical, the 


















Source: Masciandaro 2020 
But what we today call unprecedented monetary policies can often have historical 
precedents (Ugolini 2020). In this paper he wonders if  the economic policy implemented during 
the years 1629-1631, when the Republic of Venice fought first a famine and then a  pandemic, 
can be considered an historical case of helicopter money.1  
 
1  But what is helicopter money? In the literature frequently  helicopter money has been defined as any policy mix 
under which expansionary fiscal measures are financed by creating a larger monetary base (Carter and Mendes 
2020). The helicopter money concept became more precise when analysts tried to identity when an expansionary 
monetary policy could be defined as extraordinary. In this perspective two different definitions can be identified: 
net-worth helicopter money and money- base helicopter money.     
First a net-worth helicopter money may be defined as an expansionary monetary policy producing intended losses 
in the central bank’s balance sheet (Galì 2020), reducing its net worth, or the present value of future seignorage 
(Buiter 2014). Alternatively a monetary-base helicopter money could be defined as a permanent increase in central 
bank liabilities (Buiter 2014, Bernanke 2016, Di Giorgio and Traficante  2018).  
The difference between net-worth and monetary-base helicopter money is clear if we recall the role of seignorage.  
Seignorage refers to the difference between the face value of a currency and its costs of production and it can be 
evaluated using two common measures (Buiter 2007): the change in the monetary base or the revenues earned by 
investing the monetary base, i.e. central bank revenues. Net-worth helicopter money leades to a seignorage  loss, 
while monetary-base helicopter money implies seignorage gains.  
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Our aim is to show that analysing an historical episode using  a modern economic lens - 
as in the framework of helicopter money– can be  a positive sum game, on the one hand in 
terms of  understanding monetary and banking – and in general economic -  history episodes,  
and on the other hand for checking   and refining the robustness of  relevant economic  
concepts. In other words we share the view that the use of history is a useful tool in exploring 
economics (Eichengreen 2015), and vice versa.  In fact this paper is related to three different 
strands of literature, respectively on monetary policy, central banking and economic history.   
Our study relates to the  monetary  history literature that investigates the different 
models of central banking and how they eventually influenced the economic and financial 
development. Our methodology is based on the description of sequences of events  using a 
model-based causality (Monnet and Velde 2020): an exogenous (pandemic) shock is simulated 
and the model, through its equations, shows the impact of this shock on the economic policy 
design, as well as on the main macroeconomic variables. Such approach – in the tradition of 
historical macroeconomics à la Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Sargent (1983), Sargent and 
Velde (2002), Velde and Weber (2000) -   can be an effective tool to show that modern 
monetary theory can provide a logical framework to analyse  historical facts, offering plausible 
transmission mechanisms, and  at the same time that relevant conclusions can be drawn from 
historical studies to better evaluate current macroeconomic situations.  
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section Two describes what can be 
considered respectively  monetary policy and central banking in the case of the Republic of 
Venice in the first decades of the seventeenth century, with further information in Appendix A. 
Then Section Three discusses the action of the Venetian government during the 1629-1631 
period, focusing on the economics of the fiscal monetization that was implemented using the 
Giro bank and the Mint. Section Four offers a political economy perspective  to enrich the 
 
If we use at least one of these two definitions, it becomes evident that  such expansionary monetary policies differ 
from conventional (and even some unconventional) central bank asset purchases financed by issuing central bank 
reserves, that usually do not produce either intended losses on the central bank’s balance sheet or a permanent 
change in its money base. In this respect central bank asset purchases, without any further specification, are false 




explanation of  the Republic choices.   The   analysis of the historical facts in Sections Three and 
Four is augmented using a theoretical framework in Appendix B. Section Five concludes.  
 
2.  Monetary Policy and Central Banking in the Republic of Venice      
In order to analyse historical events using a modern concept such as helicopter money, 
we need to define  what were the forms respectively   of monetary policy and central banking in 
the relevant historical context. 
 First, we  need a definition of monetary policy  that has to be general from both the 
theoretical and historical point of view. Theoretically, given a standard general equilibrium 
setting with frictions,  where money  is a good   - or a token (that can perform at least one of the 
three well-known functions – unit of accounts (Loyo 2002), medium of exchange (Kyyotaki and 
Wright 1993), store of value (Wallace 1980)) a demand for money is likely to exist.  
Then  we can define monetary policy as the corresponding government issuing policy; 
the government produces outside money, whatever may be the capacity of the private sector to 
produce inside money (Holmstrom and Tirole 1998, Brunnermeier and Niepelt 2019).  In a 
sense, our definition is consistent with a Cartalist approach (Goodhart 1998), being centred on 
the link between political sovereignty on the one hand and money creation – either  through 
mint or central bank, or both – on the other side.  
Historically,  this definition can be applied in analysing the overall evolution of monetary 
history, where both commodity money and fiat money can be present. Saying that monetary 
policy is any public policy aiming to control money issuing – whatever is  the definition of money  
– allows one to discuss monetary policy episodes well in advance of the appearance of modern 
central banks, for example during the Roman Age (De Cecco 1985, Temin 2013, Bordo and Levin 
2017).  
Secondly, given such a definition of monetary policy, and  assuming the existence of  
banking -  i.e. the  existence of firms whose liabilities are inside  money, while in their asset side 
only a fraction is outside money (Rochet 2008)  - we adopt  the perspective proposed in Ugolini 
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(2017), defining central banking as a device to implement at least one of a family of public 
policies aimed at fostering  fiscal goals (Goodhart 1985) and/or monetary and financial goals 
(Capie et al. 1994).   
In a nutshell,  our conceptual framework is based on the assumption that a government  
can use the existence of both inside and outside money to pursue its goals; consequently we 
focus on the relationship between  the role of state, money circulation and banking. In this 
respect, the  Venetian economy was special for more than one reason (Ugolini 2017, p.36). For 
our purposes two features are particularly relevant.  
First, Venice  reached a degree of monetization unknown for centuries anywhere else; in 
order to economize on coins –  commodity money -  citizens commonly used  cheques and bank 
transfers, even for the lower- middle class (Ugolini 2017, p.37, Mueller 1997, p.24, Fratianni and 
Spinelli 2006, p.271). Then we can assume, as it is  in a modern economy,  that in Venice 
consumption on the one side and monetary and financial assets on the other side were strictly 
correlated.  
 Second, compared with normal late medieval status,  the relative size of State with 
respect to the size of the domestic economy was extraordinarily high (Ugolini 2017, p.37). In the 
real sector, the government,  via the Grain Office and then the Fodder Office, was active in the 
grain market, in order to address and to stabilize the volatility of food supply, including its 
pricing,  which was an extremely sensitive political issue (Ugolini 2017, p.37). In banking 
activities, and starting from the logistic side, the financial district of Venice – the Rialto area – 
was entirely owned by the Republic, which then rented to the bankers the benches at which 
they used to operate (Ugolini 2017, p.39). Moreover, the books of the bankers were considered 
as public records, the bank transfers being a legal way to discharge debt under the Venetian law 
( Sissoko 2007, p.7, Ugolini 2017, p.39). 
Yet the ideal that inspired the Venice government was that, as far as possible, the State 
should not  substitute itself in the place of private initiative in markets (Dunbar 1892, p. 308, 
Ugolini 2017, p.38). With the Republic being firmly controlled by an oligarchy of merchants, the 
government goal was just to provide the services that were on the one hand essential for  
business, and on the other hand  too expensive  and/or too risky to be provided by the 
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businessmen themselves (Ugolini 2017, p.38).  This feature of the Venice economy implies that 
in normal times  fiscal monetization was not needed. Indeed by 1600 the Republic had repaid all 
its debt, enhancing its reputation and creditworthiness (Sissoko 2002, p.8, Fratianni and Spinelli 
2006, p. 263, Alfani and Di Tullio 2019, p.172). 
The Republic of Venice issued both  commodity money (coins) and,  starting from 1587, 
scriptural money (bank deposits), through the establishment of two subsequent and overlapping  
public banks: the Rialto Bank and the Giro Bank (see Appendix A). As usual,  commodity money 
represented the monetary anchor; for example, the estimates of the state revenues were 
expressed in kilograms of silver (Alfani and Di Tullio 2019, p.32). 
Now, to describe what happened in Venice in normal times – i.e. before the period  
1629-1631 -  we will use a setting where the economy consists of a population of citizens, a 
government that controls both fiscal and monetary policies, with bankers  offering deposits 
(Dunbar 1892, p.311), funding  (Dunbar 1892, p.315-316) and setting the market exchange rate 
between the different means of payment.  
In normal times  the financial system in this economy enjoyed a steady state 
equilibrium, given that inflation was relatively low and constant  - whereas during the pandemic 
inflation significantly increased (Preto 1979, p.114). A stable consumer price was a relevant 
macroeconomic goal for the government, given that inability to secure, for example, stable flour 
price would have triggered social unrest (Ugolini 2018, p.6). Also nominal wages were stable, at 
least in the period between 1605 and 1628 (Pullan 1964,p .415).  
Finally, some clarification is needed about the notion of citizenship. On the one hand, in 
early modern times “to be a citizen took on different meanings and involved different categories 
according to places and periods” (Pezzolo 2007, p.9). On the other hand,  residing and working 
in Venice were not sufficient conditions to gain access to public services; only the rights of 
citizenship gave complete access to the local welfare, guaranteeing protection in times of crisis 
(Alfani and Di Tullio, p.59-60), which is particularly relevant for our analysis.  
Among the citizens, wealth inequality in the Republic of Venice was a relevant economic 
and historical issue (Alfani and Di Tullio 2019, p.1). The Republic was characterized by wealth 
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inequality trends, (unfortunately it is impossible to produce a similar reconstruction for income 
inequality, due to the lack of the data needed (Alfani and Di Tullio 2019, p.9)). We focus on the 
macroeconomic consequences of implementing an extraordinary fiscal policy with monetary 
and financial effects. Our conclusions would be even stronger with heterogeneity also in labour 
income.  
Disposable income and asset holdings, including government bonds (Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgensen 2012, Reis 2020),  finance consumption. In normal times, the average 
Venetian citizen finances her consumption using her income, as well as her monetary and 
financial assets, that can include coins, bank deposits and Republic bonds.   
 
3.  Pandemic Recession, Republic Fiscal Policy  and Bank of Venice Helicopter Money      
From September  1630 to September 1631 Venice wat hit by a bubonic plague (Lazzari 
et al., 2020, p.2).  Originated in Northern Europe in 1623, this pandemic crossed the Alps in 
1629, in the case of the Republic of Venice likely carried by imperial armies on their way to 
Mantua (Lazzari et al., 2020, p.2). In general, war, famine and epidemics were strictly associated 
(Alfani, 2013, p.443).  In this case French and Spanish troops crossed the Alps to the west and 
north to participate in the War of the Mantuan Succession (Alfani and Percoco, 2019).2 The 
massive outbreak took place later, between September and December 1630 – 20,923 deaths – 
with a peak  in October 1630 (Ell, 1989, p.130) and in total 43,088 deaths  were recorded over 
just three years; the population of Venice was 141,625 in 1624 and became 102,243 in 1633, a 
reduction of  nearly 30% (Lazzari et al., 2020, p.3). Such figures are consistent with the 35% 
estimated mortality in Northern Italy during the same epidemic, and should be compared to an 
estimated average annual mortality of between 3.7% and 2.7% in normal times (Lazzari et al. 
2020, p.3). Beyond the effect of the epidemic upon total population, its consequences upon 
 
2 The War of the Mantuan Succession (1628-31) was an Italian episode of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) fought 
on a European scale between supporters and opponents of the Habsburg monarchies. After the death of the 
heirless Duke of Mantua, two claimants to the succession appeared (the Duke of Guastalla and the Duke of 
Nevers). The Holy Roman Empire, Spain, and Piedmont supported Guastalla’s claim, while France and Venice 
supported Nevers’. The military outcome being unclear, the conflict was resolved by a political accord (Treaty of 
Cherasco, 1631), confirming Nevers as Duke of Mantua. 
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various sub-groups were different. Younger people – the zero from seventeen age group -  
seemed to be relatively more spared; yet the picture concerning the age effects of the plague 
remains rather confused (Weiner 1970, p.46). The upper classes – nobility and civil servants - 
seemed to be less affected by the epidemic (Weiner 1970, p.47-48). Moreover, the percentage 
of females became greater than that of males (Weiner 1970, p.49) and the plague seems to 
have led to a substantial increase in the marriage rate during the decade following it (Weiner 
1970, p.51), while there was a tendency for families to be smaller  - up to four members - than 
were those before the plague (Weiner 1970, p.52). 
From an economic perspective, the 1630 plague in Venice has been considered a 
relevant episode for more than one reason. This epidemic was a  turning point in the economic 
and social development of the Republic (Alfani and Percoco 2019). More specifically,  plague  
provided a structural break in the way in which some macro-level  variables – population 
density,  urbanization and taxation per capita - affected wealth inequality  (Alfani 2020 et al.). 
Previously, in 1629 the Republic  had already coped with a famine, where  extreme 
hunger has been  on the one hand correlated with  war  and on the other hand with the plague 
(Bertagni 1889). In the Italian states the first decades of the seventeenth century were 
characterized by severe food shortages (Alfani 2018, p. 152). In Venice from 1629 to 1631 we 
had a combination of war, famine and plague  - the Three Horsemen of the Apocalypse – 
characteristic of  the way of thinking at that  time (Alfani 2013, p.43).  In reality the interactions 
between wars, famines and epidemics are more complicated than generally assumed,  and the 
relationships between hunger and disease require even more caution, including  the commonly 
held view that recognized a causal link between famine and plague  (Alfani 2013, p.44). It is a 
matter of fact that in Venice, from the economic and social point, the structural break was the 
1630 plague (Alfani and Percoco 2019) and not the 1629 famine. Also the daily life dramatically 
changed with the outbreak of the plague in September 1630.  
An unusual indicator is that  in 1629 the musical life of Venice witnessed a special year, 
with foreign  musicians visiting the city to meet its musicians - the most famous of whom at that 
time was Claudio Monteverdi – and a rich production of Venetian music. But then the plague 
reached Venice with devasting consequences: the music publishing trade was decimated: 
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whereas in 1629 fifty collections of music were printed, in 1630 production dropped to around 
thirty, and then no collections are registered in the Venetian presses in 1631 (Gonzaga Band, 
2018).   
However, for our purposes, we can consider the two sequential events as a unique 
negative macroeconomic shock  - a calamitous or more simply a pandemic recession - that the 
incumbent government wishes to address.  In fact this perspective has been used to describe 
how the two calamities were associated with the growing liabilities of the Giro bank (Soresina 
1889, p.29).  
To address the pandemic recession the government had to decide immediately whether 
to let citizens remain in trouble  or help   them in ways that are equivalent to injecting   a lump-
sum fiscal transfer to their balance sheets. The  policy mix  would affect labour supply, 
consumption, and growth. The sequence of events is as follows (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Pandemic Recession, Republic Fiscal Policy and Banco  Helicopter Money  
 
0          Pandemic                                                   1 Fiscal and  monetary action                              2 Macroeconomic outcomes 
                                                                                              
I                                                             I                                                         I 
     PANDEMIC OUTBREAK                 ECONOMIC POLICY                           NEW NORMAL                           
 Initially we use a standard assumption that  the government is a benevolent player, i.e. 
the government cares about the Republic welfare, i.e. both personal interests and ideology of 
the policymakers in charge do not matter.  
This assumption can be modified later, given that political drivers can be found also in 
Venetian history; for example during the previous 1576 pandemic the Venetian government 
reacted in a slow way exactly for political reasons, both denying the plague and downsizing the 
number and nature of deaths (Preto 1979, p.123, Palmer 1978, p.50-238-241-275).  Somewhat 
similarly, during the 2020 pandemic episode populist and economically rightwing governments 
have reacted to the pandemic more slowly than their counterparts (Kavakli 2020).    
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If a pandemic occurs, there are extraordinary responses. At 0t = , a pandemic breaks 
out and, consequently, the government  designs and implements a containment policy. The 
starting point is the special nature of the pandemic-related recession. As a result of the 
pandemic, each national government faces an unpleasant dilemma between two public goals 
(Baldwin and Weder di Mauro 2020).  First, there is a need to protect public health by 
implementing a containment policy with the aim of minimizing the expected loss of life (Atkeson 
2020).  
In the Republic of Venice the urban mortalities rates during the 1629-1631 were severe: 
in the affected cities the mortality rates went from  433 per thousand in Chioggia to 615 per 
thousand in Verona, while in Venice the mortality rate was 330 per thousand (Alfani and Di 
Tullio 2019, p.115); the 1629-1631 plague can be considered a Black Death-like event 
considering both overall mortality and its ability to spread in the countryside (Alfani and Di 
Tullio, p.114).   
Such a containment policy  saves lives, but,  given the interactions between economic 
decisions and epidemics (Eichenbaum et al. 2020),  any containment policy has economic costs 
(Ludvigson et al. 2020). These costs simultaneously affect the two fundamental macroeconomic 
pillars of a market economy: aggregate supply (Del Rio-Chanona et al. 2020, Koren and Peto 
2020) and  aggregate demand (Andersen et al. 2020, Del Rio-Chanona et al. 2020).  
This was the case also in Venice at the time. In general the European governments 
designed and implemented stringent quarantine rules designed to check plague epidemics that 
paralysed economies (Pullan 1964,p .409). Venice implemented its first legislation to address a 
plague epidemic in 1423 (Palmer 1978, p.51) and a Health Office was established in 1490 
(Palmer 1978, p.85). Over the years Venice developed a regulation on plague with three aims: to 
prevent its originating in Venice, to impede its importation and to check its spread should it 
break out in the city (Palmer 1978, p.123. During the 1575 plague episode the Republic imposed 
a general blockade on all neighbours suspected of the plague (Pullan 1964,p .409) . 
“Unemployment, which began among second-hand clothiers and all – from schoolmasters to 
mountebanks and tavern-keepers- whose living depended on assembling crowds, soon spread 
by these means to all sections of the people.” (Pullan 1964,p .409, Palmer 1978, p.142).   
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The containment measures “ were carried into effect on a colossal scale with full 
resources of the state” (Palmer 1978, p.142).  A textile merchant pleaded for the quarantine to 
be lifted, given that “an incomparable greater number of people has died purely as a result of 
unemployment than of typhus or any other contagious disease” (Pullan 1964,p .409). It was 
argued that Verona was suffering more from the ban than from the disease itself (Palmer 1978, 
p.275). Bribery episodes were registered, being merchants anxious to get their goods into 
Venice (Palmer 1978, p.231 and p.235).  Also the regular activity of the Mint suffered during the 
plague episodes (Stahl 2001).  
Citizens suffered economic and financial losses that hit their balance sheets, as well as  
their  ability to remain safe and sound borrowers (De Vito and Gomez 2020, Elenev et al. 2020). 
In other words, with Venice being  a monetary economy,  and not  a barter economy, any 
negative effect of the pandemic recession  could summarized as a loss in the citizen balance 
sheet.  
The government can seek to address a pandemic recession  by implementing an 
extraordinary fiscal policy, that can be implemented deploying different tools (Beck 2020, 
Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2020, Brunnermeier et al. 2020, Drechsel and Kalemli-Ozcan 2020, Gros 
2020a,  Kahn and Wagner 2020, Segura and Villacorta 2020). In normal  times social 
expenditures was very low: for example, available data for 1602 and 1633  – i.e. before and after 
the pandemic – show that social expenditures were negligible, amounting respectively to 0.2% 
and  0.4% of total expenditures; in the same years the service of debt amounted respectively to 
8.2% and 19.9% (Alfani and Di Tullio 2019, p.167).  But during a pandemic the times were 
different.  
In the case of the Republic of Venice, the government bought necessary goods from 
merchants (Ugolini 2020) to distribute them among the citizens, as it had been already done 
during the 1575 plague episode (Pullan 1964,p .409). When city districts were put in quarantine 
the inhabitants  were provisioned by the State (Palmer 1978, p.143). Poor laws were promoted 
to reduce the risk of disease; “poor should be taken from their wretched housing (…) and that 




 A link between the government action and the victualing of the citizens can be found 
also in modern times: in 2020 the UK government implemented  $38 billion worth of fiscal 
programme meant to address the pandemic recession, which included a 50 percent discount for 
diners in restaurants and pubs (New York Times 2020).  
Some government policies to address a serious famine can be consistently included in 
an overall fiscal effort to help citizens: subsidies and fiscal help given to the affected 
communities, or distribution of free rations of grain (Alfani, 2018, p.162).  
Moreover, it is likely that  the Venetian government influenced employment and  
nominal wages in the sectors under its  total or partial control. Regarding for example the 
Arsenal wages, the government, “in its anxiety to prevent so vital trades from decaying, was 
accustomed to pay its workers something, even if there was nothing for them to do” (Pullan 
1964,p .420). During the 1575 pandemic a program of public works in order to give the 
unemployed people a livelihood was considered (Palmer 1978, p.275), as well as the need to 
feed them (Palmer 1978, p.275). 
Whatever may be the fiscal method, such  government action can be regarded as a 
mean for lessening citizen budget losses, where the worst scenario is  when the citizens can lose 
all their assets. It is worth noting the worst scenario was more likely for the lowest levels of the 
population, which represented the large part of the overall population: such citizens were most 
usually in debt (Alfani and Di Tullio 2019, p.62), at greatest risk of crossing the boundary 
between subsistence and poverty, especially during famines and plagues (Alfani and Di Tullio 
2019, p.63). 
How big should the government fiscal  policy  be? The possible outcomes in terms of 
fiscal policy can take the form of two opposite options. At one extreme, the government is 
absent; in this no-transfer scenario, citizens suffered losses. At the other extreme, the fiscal 
expansion helps the suffering citizens. In the second case the government injects resources in 
the economy.   
But how can the fiscal policy be financed? The government can raise taxation, issue 
debt, that  can be purchased by citizens, or issue money. The new debt, in turn, becomes an 
asset in private portfolios.  
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From the second half of the sixteenth century until the 1620s the Republic of Venice 
increased taxation: data show a moderate increase in per capita taxation from the 1550s to 
1620s –  from 6.5% to 16.1% , depending on the adopted metrics - and then the per capita 
burden grew much more markedly in the aftermath of the 1603 plague (Alfani and Di Tullio 
2019, p.33).  
Regarding public debt issuing, the earliest evidence for public debt dates back to 1164 
for Venice, where the debt of the state were called Monti (Funds). In Venice both voluntary 
lenders and forced lenders were present (Fratianni and Spinelli 2006, p.264). Compulsory 
lending was usually based on the assessments of one’s wealth (Pezzolo 2003, p. 64, Fratianni 
and Spinelli 2006, p. 262, Pezzolo 2007, p.2).  We can consider such compulsory lending as a 
device for taxation, also considering the practice of delaying the interest payments for many 
years  (Fratianni and Spinelli 2006, p. 263).   Such compulsion was progressively replaced with a 
more market-friendly approach to debt management (Fratianni and Spinelli 2006, p. 263), using 
the yield payments for collecting private coins (Fratianni and Spinelli 2006, p. 263) on a 
voluntary basis (Pezzolo 2007, p.2). As we already noted, the Republic issued both floating and 
funded (long-term) debt,3 where in normal times the role of floating debt was rather limited 
(Pezzolo 2003, p.61). 
Coming back to 1630, during the pandemic recession the government financed the fiscal 
transfer using both taxes and  monetization. On the one hand the government established a 
lump-sum wealth-tax to address the increasing public expenditures due to the containment 
 
3  The turning point for Venetian monetary and fiscal policy was the War of Chioggia (1378-81), the harsh conflict 
that solved the long-dated rivalry between the Republics of Venice and Genoa for the control of Mediterranean 
trade routes, ending with Genoa’s definitive defeat (also see Appendix A). Up to that time debt issuance had been 
relatively limited (Mueller, 1977, p.221). In 1382 the government started to borrow from anyone who had money 
(Mueller, 1977, p.222), but normally the largest holders of government securities came from the élite governing 
the Republic (Pezzolo  2007, p.15, Alfani and Di Tullio 2019, p.5 and p.172) , but without using intermediaries 
between lenders and the government, as was the case for example in Florence (Pezzolo  2007, p.6). In this respect, 
“in cities run by oligarchies the debt relied on a sort of impersonal market, where as a rule all creditors enjoyed the 
same rights and suffered the same damages”  (Pezzolo  2007, p.7). As far as foreigners were concerned, generally 
they became debt owners, but with limitations (Pezzolo 2007, p.9). In Venice the share of foreigner owners grew 
during  the seventeenth century: in 1641 one seventh of the consolidated debt was owned by foreigners (Alfani 
and Di Tullio 2019, p.172).  
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policy needs (Preto 1979, p. 144, Pezzolo 2003, p.69). At the same time the plague made the tax 
collection more difficult and caused a relevant per capita increase of the fiscal pressure (Pezzolo 
1994, p.322-323, Alfani and Di Tullio 2019, p.29).  
On the other hand the Republic financed its fiscal action using transfers issued by the 
Giro bank (Ugolini 2020). The citizens needed material and financial support: on this issue,  
during the pandemic the government allowed Jews to lend on collateral also out of the ghetto 
(Preto 1979, p.144).   
The Giro balance sheet was worth 2,071,168 ducats in April 1630 (Soresina 1889, p.23), 
and kept rising to a peak of over 2,666,926  million ducats in June 1630 (Soresina 1889, p.29, 
Roberds and Velde  2014, p.24).  The Giro bank balance sheet increase, including the 1629 
famine, rose in concert with the bubonic plague (Soresina 1889, p.29).  
At the same time  the balance sheet of the Rialto bank reached its peak of 1.7 million 
ducats in 1618, i.e. one year before the establishment of the Giro bank; then its level declined to 
0.2 million ducats in 1625 (Sissoko 2002, p.8) and in 1630 the amount of deposits of the Rialto 
bank dropped to 56,185 ducats (Sissoko 2002, p.8, Pezzolo 2018, p.155). In a sense ,the growth 
of the Giro bank crowded out the activity of the Rialto bank (Ugolini 2017, p. 44) that in fact 
ended its activity in 1638. 
Moreover up to 1625  the premium between bank transfers and coin was positive and 
substantial (Roberds and Velde 2014, p.24; see Appendix A). Then from 1625 the premium 
began to fall, slowly at first and then precipitously in 1630 (Roberds and Velde 2014, p.24) 
becoming negative (Soresina 1889, p.29); the agio  was 20% in 1624, then it dropped to 19.5% in 
1629 and fell in negative territory – 10% - in 1630 (Pezzolo 2018, p. 156).  
The over-expansion of the money supply triggered a monetary depreciation (Soresina 
1889, p.29, Roberds and Velde 2014, p.24), forcing the government to reform its monetary 
policy setting. On July 1630 a monetary board (Inquisitori del Banco Giro) (Giro bank Inspectors) 
was established, having three aristocrats as members (Soresina 1889 p.23, Roberds and Velde  
2014, p.24). The aim of the monetary action was the reduction of the Giro bank liabilities -  i.e. 
the scriptural money supply – whose parallel effect had been the reduction  of the commodity 
money assets in the hands of the Republic.  
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Recently monetary policy theory highlighted the relevance of the transfers policies 
between central banks and governments (Sims 2003, Reis 2015,  Orphanides 2016, Benigno and 
Nisticò 2020b). In the same perspective we focus our attention on the balance sheets of the 
Mint and of the Giro Bank.  
First of all, the accounts of a number of separate administrations and public 
concessionaries – they were worth  716,652  ducats – were removed from the Giro Bank and 
transferred to the Mint (Soresina 1889 p.25-26, Roberds and Velde, p.24). Private depositors 
were moreover invited to convert their Giro bank liabilities into “Mint deposits”, paying 7% 
interest (Soresina 1889, p.26; Roberds and Velde  2014, p.25). As the so-called “Mint deposits” 
were not current account deposits but inscribed bonds (Pezzolo 2003), all this amounted to the 
conversion of unremunerated sight liabilities into interest-bearing long-term bonds. 
Furthermore, Mint revenues from sales of life annuities at 14% were applied to the Giro bank 
(Soresina 1889, p.26; Roberds and Velde  2014, p.25) to strengthen its financial position. These 
combined operations netted the Giro balance sheet, thus reducing the money supply, but at the 
price of an increase in the funded public debt. Because the Giro bank was a State bank with no 
paid up capital, the operation actually amounted to a bailout of the central bank by the 
government. Secondly, to avoid trading speculation between the different kinds of money, the 
convertibility promise became available only to non- temporary account holders (no less than 
three days) (Soresina 1889, p.25, Roberds and Velde, 2014, p.24). As revealed by the collapse of 
the “agio”, during the pandemic a “flight to quality” phenomenon had occurred – the citizens 
preferred coins instead of bank money – and this can be confirmed observing that in 1630 also 
the deposit of the Rialto bank dramatically dropped, as we noted above.  
Thirdly, 100,000 ducats’ worth of small change in copper was minted and distributed to 
members of the silk and wool trade who needed it, to repay the Giro debt (Soresina 1889, p.25, 
Roberds and Velde  2014, p.24).    
Finally, anyone was allowed to pay taxes not only with bank transfers, but also with 
coins (Soresina 1889, p.25, Roberds and Velde  2014, p.24). In parallel  the obligations for  
payment settlements in Giro transfers were reduced (Soresina 1889, p.26). Both decisions seem  
consistent with the aim to reduce the demand for Giro transfers, which in turn could help the 
deleveraging of the Giro bank.  
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These government decisions were clearly motivated by monetary policy reasons, rather 
than by fiscal concerns. In fact it has been stressed (Pezzolo 2003, p.64) that the high 
indebtedness of the Giro bank cannot be seen as dramatic, considering that at that time the 
Republic budget recorded incomes around 3,5 million ducats.  
 The new monetary policy strategy brought down Giro balances to 1.4 million ducats at 
the end of 1630 (Soresina 1889, p.29, Roberds and Velde  2014, p.25), but it was not sufficient 
to restore the convertibility on demand of Giro bank liabilities  (Dunbar 1892, p.327 and p.330). 
Moreover the government was not able to stabilize the Giro balance sheet below 900,000 
ducats until 1638 (Roberds and Velde  2014, p.25). 
Summing up, and treating the amount of  800,000 ducats as the issuing target in normal 
times, the monetary policy implemented during the pandemic recession years produced an 
over-expansion of scriptural money coupled with losses in issuer capital – the central bank had 
to be bailed out by the government. Moreover, although the government avoided any 
debasement policy, convertibility on demand of scriptural money into coin had to be suspended. 
Price instability and currency devaluation were the final macroeconomic outcomes. The price 
dynamics needs to been analysed in depth, given that in general pandemics can lead to rich 
inflation dynamics with strong inflationary as well as deflationary forces (Brunnermeier et al. 
2020).  
Therefore, it is unlikely that the actual fiscal monetization was optimal  
 
5.  The Bank of Venice Helicopter Money: Politics can Matter     
If the government is a standard benevolent policymaker, its choices will be consistent 
with the social-planner decisions described in Appendix B. But if politicians are in charge and at 
the same time citizens are heterogenous, different monetary policies have associated  
redistributive effects and at the same time such policies  can have political effects if  the political 




In general, the net transfers implied by efficient policies can be positive for some and 
negative for others. Moreover, if a policy task has distributional effects, politicians would like to 
control those effects (Alesina and Tabellini 2007); the redistributive effects are relevant as long 
as the politicians care about the citizens’ preferences. And redistributive effects matter the 
more inequality is a relevant issue; as we already noted, inequality in the Republic of Venice was 
a relevant issue.  
In the Republic of Venice during the early modern period  wealth ownership was 
extremely polarized (Alfani and Di Tullio 2019, p.105-106), with both the top and the bottom of 
the wealth distribution distancing themselves from one another, as well as from the middling 
groups (Alfani and Di Tullio 2019, p. 112).  
In Venice the politicians in charge probably cared about citizens’ wishes due to 
redistributive issues. When calamities occurred public institutions reflected the expectations of 
the local population (Alfani 2018, p.162). The population, especially that in the cities, was 
watchful of the activities of the governments, and was ready to riot and tumult if they became 
convinced that the government was not doing all it could, and should have done, to ensure the 
availability of food, guaranteeing the “right to bread” (Alfani 2018, p.162).  
Moreover, the government had much to fear, also in terms of personal safety, from riots 
motivated by distributional reasons – the “injustice” (Alfani 2018, p.162) – so the incentives to 
act for the politicians were really strong (Alfani 2018, p.162). In  other words, most early modern 
popular riots seem to have been caused by “political” claims (Alfani and Di Tullio 2019, p.13). 
The citizens’ preferences mattered, notwithstanding full citizenship did not guarantee full 
“political” rights as those were reserved to the patriciate (Alfani and Di Tullio 2019, p.61).  
 The extraordinary expansionary monetary policy that was implemented in Venice 
during 1629-31 can be considered optimal from the perspective of poor citizens. In this respect, 
the government decision can be considered consistent with   the aim to  please  the majority of 
citizens  during a pandemic recession, enhancing  consensus and avoiding riots.  
Summing up, our interpretation of the monetary stance in Venice during the 1629-1631 
period is as follow: the government, in order to avoid riots and disturbances, implemented a 
massive fiscal policy  that has been financed through money issuing; the money supply excess 
triggered monetary instability, and the government was forced to partially sterilize the money 
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creation, suffering losses (the central bank had to be bailed out, and losses covered by future tax 
revenues).  
The final outcome was an extraordinary monetary expansion coupled with losses for the 
money issuer, which is exactly the modern definition of net-worth helicopter money. In a sense, 
a redistributive monetary policy was implemented. However, the policy was financed by 
earmarking future tax revenues to the payment of debt interests. Because taxes were strongly 
regressive in Venice, this means that short-term redistribution in favour of the poor was 
compensated by a long-term redistribution in favour of the wealthy. And in fact, this policy did 
not cause permanent changes in the conditions of poor citizens, given that  analyses of income 
distribution show  that the 1629-31 pandemic did not trigger  a phase of sustained inequality 




Which are the drivers and the effects of an extraordinary fiscal monetization motivated 
by the need to address a pandemic recession? The aim of this paper has been to analyse the 
monetary policy that the Most Serene Republic of Venice implemented in the years of 
calamities, using the modern concept of helicopter money, precisely  an  extraordinary money 
issuing coupled with capital losses for the issuer.  
The 1629 famine and the 1630-1631 plague was a negative macroeconomic shock, that 
the incumbent government addressed using fiscal monetization. Consolidating the balance 
sheets of the Mint and of the Giro Bank, and having heterogenous citizens – inequality matters - 
we showed that the Republic actually implemented helicopter money driven by political 
economy  reasons, in order to avoid popular riots. This analysis can be further enriched in 
several fruitful directions: 
a) Monetary stability risks and citizen heterogeneity: in this paper monetary instability is  
assumed to be an homogeneous social cost, that is borne equally by all individuals as an 
outcome of the fiscal monetization. But citizens can be heterogeneous in their ability to address 
such risks through hedging, with some individuals facing – or feeling that they face – higher 
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costs due to monetary instability (i.e. inflation-adverse citizens). Allowing for this kind of 
heterogeneity would lead to a straightforward prediction: the smaller the mass of such inflation 
risk-adverse citizens, the stronger the political pressure to engage in fiscal monetization.  
b) b) Income, taxation and citizen heterogeneity: labour income and taxation has been  
assumed to be the same for all individuals. In the presence of income and/or taxation 
heterogeneity, the distributional effects are likely to increase. For example, given the decisions 
regarding the fiscal policy as well as its monetization, if richer citizens are likely to have higher 
tax burden, all else equal, they would prefer smaller fiscal policies. The income and/or taxation 
heterogeneity can be relevant in strengthening or weakening political pressure in favour or 
against the fiscal monetization.  
c) Public debt and  interest rates: here  government debt is only issued to address the 
pandemic-related recession and the interest-rate level remained consistent with the long-term 
risk-free interest rate. The insertion of initial debt into the framework would increase its 
complexity but  not have any substantial consequences for the overall rationale, maintaining the 
lump-sum feature of the fiscal monetization option. Furthermore, interest rate endogeneity 
depending on the stock of debt is likely to exacerbate the policy trade-offs and, consequently, 
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Appendix A: Money and Central Banking in Venice   
The Republic of Venice issued both  commodity money (coins) and, starting from 1587, 
scriptural money (bank deposits).  
Regarding the commodity money, the mint of Venice was active since 814, issuing coins 
that progressively came to dominate Mediterranean trade from the thirteenth century (Stahl 
2000, Day 2003). Coinage  was essential for trade reasons; but at the same time the mint activity 
produced relevant revenues for the Republic (Stahl 2001, p.42). Eventually in preindustrial times 
the economics of minting  (Sargent and Velde 1997a and 1997b, Redish and Weber 2011) was 
essential to address the never-ending   trade-off between monetary stability and seignorage.  
The crisis of the War of Chioggia (1378-81) can be considered a turning point, given that 
this fiscal emergency led the Venetian government to implement a debasement policy, altering 
the standard of its coins (Stahl 2000). The early fifteenth century saw reforms to both gold and 
silver mints (Stahl 2000, Day 2003). The debasement strategy was a policy that governments 
frequently implemented in response to negative macroeconomic shocks (Kindleberger 1991).  
Regarding scriptural money, on April 1587 (Roberds and Velde 2014 p.19) the Most 
Serene Republic of Venice  definitively established its first public bank, after a process started on 
December 1584 (Soresina, 1889, p.7): the Banco di Rialto (Bindseil 2019, pp.207-10). Until then 
the government provided public money by issuing gold, silver and copper coins through its 
minting activity (Roberds and Velde 2014 p.19).  
The Rialto bank was created by the government  to correct a market failure: the private  
sector  per se was unable to supply an efficient payment service (Roberds and Velde 2014 p.15), 
given that the Venetian payment system has been characterized by a series of  bank failures 
(Ugolini 2018, p.5). In 1584 It has been calculated that only seven private banks out of  one 
hundred and three were able to avoid bankruptcy procedures (Lattes 1880, p.40, Dunbar 1892, 
p.312); in such procedures  banks were not considered at all as special firms (Lattes 1880, ,p.47), 
i.e. activities needing special bankruptcy procedures. Yet a banking supervision body was 
established from 1524, having three aristocrats as members (Anonimo 1847, p. 364). 
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 In Venice both investment credit and consumer credit were available (Mueller 1977, 
p.294), given that traditionally the bankers permitted  on the side a depositor to overdraw her 
account (Mueller 1977, p.159) and on top making the sum immediately available for payments 
via  transfers, whose effects were the same as that of modern cheques (Mueller 1977, p.159, 
227).   
Overdrafts were recognized as legitimate by the state (Mueller 1977, p.214), and  
deposit transferability was available;  for example a loan between two citizens could be based 
on a bank deposit, given that bankers accepted deposits, letting their depositors settle credit-
debt relationships by transferring deposits between each other (Roberds and Velde 2014, p.15). 
The association between asset holding and credit availability can be further confirmed from the 
fact that in normal times the premium between a bank transfer and the coin was positive 
(Roberds and Velde 2014, p.24) , i.e. the  ducato di banco (bank ducat) had a superior value than 
a ducato d’argento (silver ducat) (Anonimo 1847, p.365 used the two denominations). 
 
In theory, the Banco di Rialto  was supposed to represent a case of  quasi-narrow 
banking, given that it was obliged by law to accept only deposits in coins, and the cash was 
always to remain available at the request of depositors (Anonimo 1847, p.564; Dunbar 1892, 
p.321), defining tendentially a policy of 100% reserves (Sissoko 2002, p.7 and p.10); transfers 
had to be made simultaneously between creditors and debtors (Dunbar 1892, p.321, Roberds 
and Velde 2014 p.20). In practice, however, because the coins into which the Banco’s liabilities 
were formally convertible had been withdrawn from circulation in 1588, bank liabilities were de 
facto inconvertible into the new circulating coins (Roberds and Velde 2014, pp.21-2; Ugolini 
2017, pp.225-6). Coins were the main item in the asset side of the Rialto bank, notwithstanding 
– to a certain extent -  also private commercial debt was allowed (Ugolini 2017, p.44). Moreover 
the Rialto bank eventually centralized the clearing mechanism for payments in Venice (Dunbar 
1892, p.323, Fratianni and Spinelli 2006, p.271). 
In 1593 Banco liabilities became legal tender (Anonimo 1847, p.366, Roberds and Velde  
2014, p.21) and its deposits in 1603 represented  80% of the overall volume of exchange 
settlements in Venice (Sissoko 2002, p.8, Roberds and Velde  2014, p.21).  During these years 
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the two legal tenders – coins and Rialto transfers – were imperfect substitutes, with a premium 
(“agio”) for payments in transfers relative to those in coins (Dunbar 1892, p.318, Fratianni and 
Spinelli 2006, p.271, Ugolini 2018, p.7), as well as between large and small coins (Sargent and 
Velde, 1977b, p.23). The conversion rate between the different types of money was determined 
on the market, and its setting was even more complicated by the fact that Venice adopted  a 
bimetallic monetary standard  (Cessi 1937). 
The existence of a positive premium between public banking money (scriptural money) 
and coins (commodity money) was almost a constant in the Venetian experience; only 
sometimes were  they brought at par (Roberds and Velde  2014, p.17). From an economic point 
of view, as we will see later, the premium drivers are likely to be on the one hand the credit 
availability attached with the public bank money (Dunbar 1892, p.330), and on the other hand 
the quality of the available  commodity money (Dunbar 1892, p.331). The premium can be 
considered a relative price between scriptural money and commodity money, and it was 
associated with the relative quantity/quality of the two monies.  
Regarding the Banco’s governance, the bank manager was a public concessionaire 
(Ugolini 2017 p.36), who was called “Depositario” (escrow agent) (Anonimo 1847, p.364), or 
“Governatore” 4 (governor) (Soresina, 1889, p.8), chosen and paid  by the government, given a 
list of submitted proposals (Roberds and Velde 2014 p.20). The government was the guarantor 
of the deposits (Pezzolo 2018, p.153); yet the governor was required  to post a bond as 
guarantee and he was considered responsible for the full satisfaction of any bank obligation at 
the end of his mandate – upon request, in cash -  (Ugolini 2017, p. 42),  under pains of 
confiscation and banishment (Roberds and Velde 2014 p.20). Moreover, all bank officers were 
required to post a guarantee (Anonimo 1847, p.364) .  
 The venality of offices was in part a device for  public funding: the purchaser of the 
office paid a given amount (the principal) – or made a temporary loan posting a guarantee – 
while the government paid him a salary (the interest) (Pezzolo 2007, p. 8). The Bank was to be 
 
4 Some authors used the name “Depositario” to define the governor of the Rialto bank (Sandi 1756, Ferro 1778, 
Anonimo 1847) while others (Soresina 1889, p.5, Luzzatto 1954, p.231) used “Governatore”, claiming that 
“Depositario” has been used for the first time later, when the Giro bank was established. 
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formally liquidated every three years (Dunbar 1892, p.321), in order to reduce the possibility of 
losses larger than the governor’s personal assets, while the private bankers were required to 
liquidate every six years (Roberds and Velde  2014, p.21). Moreover, the costs of the bank 
establishment were to be met by public resources – i.e. import taxes (Dunbar 1892, p.312). 
Summing up, the Banco di Rialto was a quasi- narrow bank, acting also as a clearing 
house, and governed through  a public concession managed by a hybrid player, being the 
governor in charge, a mix between a public manager and a private banker.  
In May 1619 the government created a new public bank (Soresina 1889, p.9; Bindseil 
2019, pp.215-7) – the Banco del Giro – with  floating (short-term) public debt and coins in the 
asset side  (Roberds and Velde  2014, p.24) and the  Giro transfers in the liability side, which 
represented convertible money up to 1630. In general the Republic issued both floating and 
funded (long-term) debt, where in normal times the role of floating debt was rather limited 
(Pezzolo 2003, p.61). In general the state’s creditors were likely to become floating debt holders, 
using the transfer mechanism. This mechanism had been first introduced in the 13th century 
when the Grain Office and Salt Office had started providing transfers for their creditors, and also 
the Fodder Office used it from 1608 to 1614  (Pezzolo 2003, p.63, Roberds and Velde  2014, 
p.24, Ugolini 2018, p.6). 
Regarding the respective business roles of the two public banks, while the Rialto bank 
was a deposit bank, the Giro bank was a device to make the public debt easily transferable, 
turning it into a means of payment (Roberds and Velde 2014, p.22), and “paying deposits at the 
call of the depositor, like the existing Banco di Rialto” (Dunbar 1892, p.325), with the possibility 
of deposit overdrawing (Dunbar 1892, p.325), i.e. to make loans. The account holders were 
floating debt holders; the Giro bank was allowed to accept deposits of private individuals only 
from 1643 (Sissoko 2002, p.11). 
In this respect the Giro bank can be defined an issue bank (Sissoko 2002, p. 11, Fratianni 
and Spinelli 2006, p.272), with its liabilities  and its main asset  floating public debt. The core of 
this mechanism lay in the relationships between the Giro Bank and the State Mint, via the role 
of floating debt holders, that we will describe below. Briefly  the Giro bank establishment in 
1619 can be considered the final step in a process aimed at increasing the transferability of 
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floating debt transfers, transforming them into means of payment (Sissoko 2002, p.9, Fratianni 
and Spinelli 2006, p.272). 
The functioning of the Giro bank was both innovative and simple (Ugolini 2017, p.43): 
the government opened accounts to merchants having credits to the Republic, that could be 
converted in coins upon authorization (Soresina 1889 p.12 and p.16); the credit of one 
accountholder could always be freely transferred on demand to another accountholder 
(Soresina 1889 p.16), and the corresponding amount would continue to circulate until the final 
repayment to the last bearer cancelled it out (Ugolini 2017, p. 43). The Giro bank liabilities were 
legal tender for any payment greater than one hundred ducats, while its clearing activity  was 
possible also for payments lower than one hundred ducats (Soresina 1889 p.12). Moreover from 
July 1627 the account holders could pay import taxes using Giro bank transfers (Soresina 1889 
p.20). 
The convertibility promise on Giro bank deposits was based on the fact that in the State 
Mint an amount of bullion served as a fund to back the operations of the Giro, although the 
backing was not 100%. In fact on June 1619 the Senate authorized on the one hand the creation 
of 150,000 ducats’ worth of coin reserves earmarked at the Mint for the Banco, and on the 
other hand  a 500,000 ducats’ worth of bank balances to pay its creditors ((Soresina 1889 p.12-
13, Roberds and Velde  2014, p.23) -  i.e. the holders of the Banco transfers. Moreover, one 
share of the future output of the Mint was earmarked to repay Giro bank money in coin (and 
thus, to “destroy” scriptural money): the decree of foundation of the Banco actually ordered 
monthly transfers of 10,000 ducats from the Mint to the Giro for repayments (Roberds and 
Velde  2014, p.24) up to the limit of 50,000 ducats (Soresina 1889 p.15). 
On January 1620 the overall balance and the monthly transfers became respectively 
700,000 ducats and 20,000 ducats; the monthly transfers eventually became 80,000 ducats on 
August 1625 (Soresina 1889 p.17, Roberds and Velde  2014, p.24). The Giro balance was further 
increased on May 1621 – by 100,000 ducats – and on June 1621 – by 40,000 ducats. 
Then, “as long as the monthly flow was sufficient to accommodate depositors’ requests, 
the bank’s liabilities remained convertible  (….). This would remain the modus operandi until 
1666: the State (….) adjusted the monthly flows of cash from the Mint to service the redemption 
requests” (Roberds and Velde  2014, p.24).  
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The Giro bank seems to have had some flexibility in the choice of coins in which  to 
repay (Roberds and Velde  2014, p.24).  Progressively  convertibility difficulties arose, with 
delaying payments going hand in hand with further creation of liabilities (Dunbar 1892, p.327). 
As we will see, authorizations to convert liabilities into coins were suspended in 1630 (Dunbar 
1893, p.211) during the pandemic, eventually transforming the Giro bank into the first example 
of a purely fiduciary state-issued legal-tender money (Ugolini, 2018, p.7), acting as a 
clearinghouse for the community (Sissoko 2002, p.10).  
The Giro Bank was based on  a public  - although temporary - commitment: the floating 
debt has to be extinguished and the accounts closed within three years; however the deadline 
was extended from year to year (Ugolini 2017, p. 42).  The Banco transfers remained convertible 
in coins upon authorization until 1666, when full convertibility on demand was established 
(Roberds and Velde  2014, p. 26; Ugolini 2017, pp. 225-7). Finally, the Republic defined an 
issuing target for normal times: in fact the government came to the conclusion that the Giro 
balance sheet should not exceed 800,000 ducats (Roberds and Velde  2014, p. 24). 
Contemporary monetary theory, indeed, included early statements on the need of quantity 
limitations in money issuing (Sargent and Velde 1977b, p. 51). The Giro balance sheet reached a 
level of 813,751 ducats level in 1624 (Soresina 1889 p.19, Roberds and Velde  2014, p.24).  
However in the same balance sheet coins were just worth 80 ducats, indicating that  
convertibility requests were likely to be limited (Soresina 1889 p.19) or, alternatively, unlikely to 
be authorized.  
In respect to governance, as in the case of the Rialto bank, the officers in the new public 
bank were concessionaires  (Soresina 1889 p.13, Dunbar 1892, p.325, Roberds and Velde  2014, 
p. 23); the main officer was called the Depositario,  (Soresina 1889 p.8, Dunbar 1892, p.324 and 
335), with a three months mandate (Soresina 1889 p.9). 
All in all: from 1619 a duopolistic public banking system was born in Venice, where the 
liabilities of the two banks were treated as equivalent (Dunbar 1892, p.324, Ugolini 2017, p. 44), 
including the seizure exemption privilege (Soresina 1889 p.8), meaning that in no case the 
judicial courts had the power to seize their deposits.  
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Moreover, in the period of coexistence  the two public banks were interconnected in 
some coin exchange operations (Soresina 1889 p.9); while the reciprocal  clearing of their 
liabilities was forbidden, given the need to maintain separation between the two banks 
(Soresina 1889 p.13). The duopolistic setting ended in 1637, when the Banco di Rialto was shut 
down (Soresina 1889 p.8, Dunbar 1892, p.324, Roberds and Velde  2014, p. 25, Fratianni and 
Spinelli 2006 p.271, Ugolini 2017 p.44), with the Banco del Giro remaining the only public Bank 






Appendix B: Pandemic Recession, Helicopter Money and Central Banking   
 
Let us start from normal times. For the sake of simplicity, the population size is one: 
total and per-capita amounts are the same for all the variables in the model. The citizens are risk 
neutral, and they draw utility from consumption and disutility from labour. They use their net 
labour income, as well as their monetary and financial assets,  to buy consumption goods. We 
use a general economic setting where heterogeneity in the composition of citizen assets is 
coupled with homogeneity in labour income (Masciandaro and Passarelli 2019, Masciandaro 
2020).   
Starting with labour income, let individual utility from labour be: 
)()1( lUl −−τ .                                                                                                                     (1) 
Labour productivity is normalized to one. Then )1( τ−l  is the after-tax (net) labour 
income.   )(lU  is a standard increasing and convex effort function. After knowing τ, each citizen 
chooses how much to work in order to maximize her welfare. The optimality condition yields 
each individual’s labour-supply function: 
)1()( 1 ττ −= −lUL .                                                                                                                 (1’) 
Labour supply )(τL  is decreasing in the tax rate, 0<TL , which is the same for all 
citizens. We acknowledge that this assumption simplifies a tax system that was rather muddled 
and complicated (Alfani and Di Tullio 2019, p.24). At the same time, the main source of revenues 
for the Republic was taxes -  which were both “direct” and “indirect” (Alfani and Di Tullio 2019, 
p.27). More importantly the Venetian taxation system had a marked “regressive” nature (Alfani 
and Di Tullio 2019, p.147), which is exactly the assumption that we are going to use, using a 
lump-sum tax. In any case,  this assumption can be modified without any loss of generality.  
Given such productivity, and a population size of one, the labour supply equals total 
income: )(τLy = . Therefore, in normal times, output growth in equilibrium depends on tax 
policy, and  l* is the optimal labour supply, which depends on the selected tax policy, such that  
).(* τLl ≡   
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Moreover, each citizen, given their labour income (l*) , as well as their  initial wealth 
  -   real assets -  can have financial (banking and monetary) assets with a total value of π and 
an overall return of  λ ; therefore   (1+  will be the total amount of financial liabilities. The 
financial  yield λ >0 is determined according to a financial no-arbitrage condition with respect to 
a perfect, long-term,  international risk-free interest rate, which we normalize to zero for 
simplicity. All in all,  citizens draw utility from consumption, c, and the budget constraint of a 
citizen who owns an average portfolio is then: 
                                            (2) 
 
Now let us assume that in this economy a pandemic recession occurs. 
Citizens suffered  losses that hit their financial balance sheets: any negative effect of the 
pandemic recession  could be summarized as a  unexpected loss in the citizen balance sheet. In 
fact, in absence of public support, if we assume that a containment policy  (lockdown) is 
associated with less income and less possibility to sell real assets, such as policy   implies during 
the pandemic period a one- shot reduction of financial assets to finance consumption; the 
unexpected reduction is a proportion γ, of the citizen’s  financial balance sheet  )1( λπ + .  
How big should the government fiscal  policy  be? The possible outcomes in terms of 
fiscal policy can take the form of two opposite options. At one extreme, the government is 
absent; in this no-transfer scenario, citizens suffered financial  losses. At the other extreme, the 
fiscal expansion helps the suffering citizens. In the second case the government injects 
resources in the economy, and the metric of this fiscal action is  a proportion, β , of the citizen’s  
financial losses   γ )1( λπ + .  
The fiscal bailout is naturally parameterized on the losses the citizens suffered. 
Moreover we can assume that the  government implements its fiscal action using direct financial 
transfers to citizens. It is worth noting that, being the financial assets the only source of 
heterogeneity among citizens, such metric allows us to highlight in the clearest and simplest way 
the redistributive effects of the fiscal backstop. Thus, β  is the policy variable that 




The government finances its policy by making a simultaneous decision regarding 
taxation, the issuance of new funded debt and fiscal monetization, which is the issuing of 
floating debt in the hands of the Giro bank. The government defines the optimal fiscal policy, 
β *. If the fiscal policy )1( λβπ + , is implemented, then the government supports the citizens’  
welfare. It finances this policy by issuing new debt at time 1. At the same time, it charges a 
linear income tax, τ , for servicing the debt at time 2. Without default risk, the overall 
government budget constraint is:  
                                                                         (3)          
where τ is the tax rate, y is the income of the citizens before taxes, i  is the interest paid on the 
government bond and δ  is the fiscal  monetization  where [ ]1,0∈δ . As noted above, at the 
beginning of the 17th century the state of public finance in  Venice was good; the government 
offered 4% bonds just for investment opportunities (Sissoko 2002, p.8), while the long-term 
return from trade was estimated to be 6.4% per annum (Sissoko 2007, p.6).  In 1632 the holders  
of the Venetian funded debt received a return of 5% (Pezzolo 2003, p.65).   
The interest rate on funded debt is determined according to a financial no-arbitrage 
condition with respect to a perfect, long-term,  international risk-free interest rate, which we 
normalize to zero for simplicity. For any unit of debt issued in time 1, the government repays 
)1(1 δ−+ i  in time 2. The cost of debt, )1( δ−i , is negatively associated with the degree of 
fiscal monetization. When an higher monetization is implemented (i.e. high δ ), a lower portion 
of funded debt will be sold to citizens.  Without any loss of generality, the demand function for 
long term bonds by citizens is flat; if we were to assume a diminishing marginal utility for long 
term bond holders, the government trade- offs should be even more evident.  
 The design of the economy policy action will influence the citizens’ welfare. Disposable 
income and assets finance consumption. Such assumption can be particularly relevant during a 
pandemic: lockdowns produce material deprivation and households can draw on both income 
and wealth to address the unexpected shock. When the fiscal policy, β , is implemented at time 




                                    (6) 
The first term is the value of the fiscal transfer, the second term is the value of the government 
bonds inclusive of interest payments, and the third term represents the difference between the 
initial wealth, w, and the value of the purchased bonds. Notably, the fiscal policy influences 
welfare through three channels: the direct value of the fiscal transfers and the indirect effect 
due to the interest payments on funded debt, which simultaneously discounts the monetization 
effect. 
Last step: citizens draw utility from consumption, c, at time 2. The budget constraint of a 
citizen who owns an average portfolio is then: 
                                      
(7) 
where l* is the optimal labour supply, which depends on the selected tax policy, such that  
).(* τLl ≡   
Finally, does the policy mix produce long-standing effects? If the answer is positive,  we 
need to consider welfare losses that may be caused by monetary and financial externalities, 
internalizing future negative spillovers due to the economic policy action that can affect the 
economy when the pandemic recession ends.  
First of all,  fiscal monetization is not a free lunch. In other words, it may create 
monetary externalities.  In general the monetary externalities can depend on the association 
between central bank seignorage and monetary stability risks, where the more traditional 
channel is the relationship between seignorage and inflation tax, which represents the reduction 
in the real value of the monetary base due to a possible change in the consumer prices (Buiter 
2007). In Venice the over-production of money created currency depreciation and uncertainty, 
harming trade and commerce; in 1627 the Republic felt the need to reinforce  the monetary 
regulation, strengthening the Giro bank accountability (Soresina 1889, p.20-22). 
Then we assume that the monetization is associated with increasing monetary stability 
risks, such that that the monetary expansion can threaten the monetary stability goal in the new 
normal times. To ensure that the maximization problem is concave,  we assume that the costs of 
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monetary instability, , are quadratic in the degree of monetary accommodation 
δ :     
                                                                                                (8) 
                                                                                          
We assume that the monetary externality is homogenous among citizens in order to 
show that it is sufficient to have heterogeneity just in asset composition among citizens to have 
a multiple equilibria setting. 
Moreover, in the real world the less the government is involved in supporting the 
economy during the pandemic recession, the more likely are negative second-round effects in 
the well-functioning of the banking system in the new normal times.  In Venice discussions on 
the feasibility of instituting a public bank – that started from the second half of the fourteenth 
century (Mueller 1997, p.111) – were motivated by the need to prevent problems  - cash 
shortage and trade disruption (Sissoko 2007, p.9) for citizens and foreigners alike  during the 
banking instability events.  
To capture in the simplest way this channel, let the financial externality function be:   
                                                                                                                            (9) 
The externalities are increasing and convex in the amount of financial losses, and they  
are lower the higher are the cash transfers, β , that the government implements.  Also the 
financial externalities are homogenous among citizens.  
Therefore, the overall  indirect utility function, ),( δβV , of the average citizen at time 2 
is: 
.                                                          (10) 
As the population size is one, ),( δβV  also represents the social-welfare function. 
The last step is the identification of the optimal economic policy mix. Our starting 
assumption is  that  the Venice government acts as a long-sighted social planner. Therefore, the 
Venetian government takes the relationship between the tax policy, τ , and the labour supply 
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into account. It simultaneously sets the policy strategy regarding the fiscal transfer  *β , and 
the monetary policy, *δ , at time 1 in order to maximize the social-welfare function, ),( δβV .  
If the government is a  benevolent policymaker, its choices will be consistent with the 
social-planner decisions: fiscal and monetary policy can be optimally coordinated (among 
others,  from Abel 1987 to Bianchi et al. 2020), including the degree of fiscal monetization 
(among others, Chari  and Kehoe 1999, Punzo and Rossi 2019). 















η i                                                        (11) 






* .                                                                                                                       (12)     
The optimal level, *δ , of fiscal monetization has well-defined properties. It increases: 
a) if the labour supply is relatively elastic, given that the corresponding tax-distortion risk is high; 
b) if the cost of debt servicing is high and c) if the monetary instability risks are low. 
 
We need to explore the citizen preferences regarding the policy mix implemented by 
the government to address the pandemic recession.  
Given a citizen j, let jλλ +  be the amount of his or her leverage at time 0,  and  jππ +  
be the amount of assets in j’s portfolio. Depending on jλπ > 0 or < 0, citizen j will be a 
subsidized citizen relative to the average. Let )( jL λ be the distribution of the subsidized citizens 
across the population. Being the leverage a proxy for the fiscal transfer, the leverage of the 
median citizen will tell us whether the subsidized citizens represent the majority or a minority of 




Moreover, citizens can be heterogeneous also as funded debt holders. Let 
πδλβ )1)(1)(( −++ jb  be the amount of bonds in j’s portfolio at time 0. Depending on jb > 0 
or < 0, citizen j will be a wealthy citizen relative to the average. Let )( jbG  be the distribution of 
wealthy citizens in the population. The average of )( jbG  is zero. The financial wealth of the 
median citizen signals whether the wealthy voters represent the majority or a minority of the 
population. If the wealthy citizens are the majority, the poor citizens represent the minority.  
Given the general individual utility function (10) and the above definitions of jjj b,,λπ , 
the voter j’s utility ),( δβjV is:  
( , ) ( , ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )j j jV V b iβ δ β δ βπ λ λ π δ= + + + + −                             (13) 
where the last two terms on the right-hand side account for the two forms of heterogeneity of 
citizen j relative to the average. Each citizen’s preferences can differ from those of the social 
planner because of these two terms. Zooming on the monetary policy preferences, given 
),( δβjV , the corresponding FOC and the social optimality condition δV , the optimal fiscal  
monetization for the citizen  j is: 
0)1( ≤+−= ibVV jj πλδδ .                                                                                                  (14) 








= .                                                                                                    (15) 
By comparing equation (15) with the optimal monetary policy (12), it is immediately 
evident that, given a fiscal policy 0≠β , a political distortion can arise between the citizen 
preferred policy and the social optimal monetary policy:   
                                                                                                         (16) 
The political distortion will reflect the citizen heterogeneity. More precisely, other things 
being equal the number of citizens that like  fiscal monetization will be higher the higher is the 
number of poor   citizens.  
